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Abstract 
This paper develops a methodology to assess transport infrastructure investments and 
their effects on a Nash equilibria taking into account competition between multiple 
privatized transport operator types. The operators, including high-speed rail, hub and 
spoke legacy airlines and low cost carriers, maximize profit functions via prices, 
frequency and train/plane sizes, given infrastructure provision and costs and 
environmental charges. The methodology is subsequently applied to all 27 European 
Union countries, specifically analyzing four of the prioritized Trans-European Networks. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we develop a methodology to analyze competition between imperfectly 
substitutable transport networks in the medium to long distance passenger market. Such a 
methodology may prove valuable to the development of transport policy. In recent years, 
the ‘legacy carriers’ have lost ground to the newly formed ‘low-cost’ carriers. Since 
liberalization, the regional low-cost carriers have performed admirably whereas many 
legacy-carriers have foundered; a number of carriers are on the verge of bankruptcy, 
while others (such as KLM) entered alliance agreements or mergers to ensure their long-
run existence. The methodology developed in this paper may be used to explain airline 
performance and to predict the impact of mergers between legacy carriers (Adler and 
Smilowitz (2007)).  
 
Another recent development in the medium to long haul transport market is the increasing 
interest in high-speed rail. Whilst air transport demand in the European Union grew at an 
average annual rate of 5% over the last decade, high-speed rail passenger demand has 
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grown by 16% over the same timeframe (Janic 2003). The European Union is considering 
increasing its financial assistance to these projects by setting up an infrastructure fund 
with the aim of encouraging the further development of connecting track across countries 
for purposes of social cohesion. An additional aim, in terms of environmental 
transportation policy, is to encourage travelers to change modes, namely to move from air 
to rail transport (European Commission (2001)). An important reason for encouraging 
mode substitution, in an attempt to reduce the environmental impact of transport, is 
clearly explained in IPCC (1999) and Givoni (2007). The methodology developed in this 
paper can be used to predict the likelihood of success of high-speed rail in the face of 
competition from airlines. We use the case of high-speed rail to illustrate the workings of 
the model. Specifically, we analyze the potential addition of Trans-European high-speed 
rail network (TEN) projects in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia and Spain on 
the existing infrastructure in the year 2020 (see Appendix A for a complete description of 
the proposed networks). 
 
Using a game theoretic setting, the model framework computes equilibria with and 
without the high-speed rail investments, permitting analyses of the level of rail 
infrastructure charges on the transport operators’ behavior. A social welfare function 
enables an objective analysis of the potential effects of such changes on producers 
(privatized companies providing transportation services), consumers (traveling public, 
split into business and leisure categories), government authorities (local or federal) and 
the infrastructure manager, accounting for the effects of infrastructure modifications on 
taxes and subsidies as well as the environment. The model is based on discrete choice 
theory of product differentiation (Anderson et al., 1996). A representative consumer is 
assumed to choose the travel alternative (mode and route) which yields the highest utility. 
The utility depends on the various characteristics of the alternative, including fare, travel 
time, distance, routing etc. The alternatives have been split into two nests, one air 
alternative consisting of all hub-spoke and low cost carriers and the second nest including 
high-speed rail and the no travel / road option. The no-travel / road option is included so 
that demand for air and rail can increase or decrease following a change in one of the 
variables explaining the utility of a passenger. Without this option, such a change would 
only lead to a redistribution of demand over the various air and rail alternatives. 
 
Up until the early 1990’s, airline competition and airline network strategies were 
generally treated as separate subjects in the literature. Ghobrial and Kanafani (1985) did 
seek to identify equilibrium in an airline network, however they restricted the case to 
single hub networks. Several papers have since been written in the field of airline 
competition using hub-spoke networks, including Hansen (1990), Hong and Harker 
(1992), Dobson and Lederer (1993), Nero (1996), Hendricks et al. (1999), Marianov et al. 
(1999), Bhaumik (2002) and Adler (2001, 2005). Hansen (1990) developed an n-player, 
non-cooperative game in which the airline's sole strategy set is frequency of service. The 
set of simplifying assumptions includes fixed airfares, adequate capacity, inelastic 
demand to price and service level and consideration of nonstop and one-stop services 
only. Using regression analysis, Hansen could not prove the existence of an equilibrium 
and his application to the US air transportation industry showed “quasi-equilibrium”. 
Hong and Harker (1992) developed a two-stage, game-theoretic representation of an air 
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traffic network market mechanism for slot allocation which they solve for a three node 
example. Dobson and Lederer (1993) developed a mathematical program to study the 
competitive choice of flight schedules and route prices by airlines operating in a single 
hub system. Utilizing a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for a two-stage game, they 
found equilibria in a five-node network example. Assumptions in their model include a 
single aircraft size, one class of customers and that duopolists serve the identical set of 
spoke cities using the same hub. Marianov, Serra and ReVelle (1999) discuss the 
relocation of hubs in a competitive environment given changes in the demand matrix over 
time. Demand, in terms of flow, is captured through a minimum cost breakdown in order 
to avoid the use of prices. Adler (2001) evaluates airline profits based on profit 
maximization under deregulation and its connection to hub-and-spoke networks. Through 
a two-stage Nash best-response game, equilibria in the air-transportation industry are 
identified. The game is applied to an illustrative example, where profitable hubs are 
clearly recognizable and monopolistic and duopolistic equilibria are found, the latter 
requiring sufficient demand. Bhaumik (2002) and Adler (2005) analyze real world 
industry conditions. Bhaumik (2002) uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze 
domestic air travel in India based on a non-zero sum game that searches for a focal point 
amongst Nash equilibria. Bhaumik’s paper studies how a regulator could ensure a 
reasonable equilibrium outcome by setting airfares, license fees or essential air service 
requirements. Adler (2005) develops a model framework to identify the most profitable 
hub-spoke networks, with the aim of classifying airports most likely to remain major 
hubs in Western Europe. 
 
In the cost-benefit analysis literature discussing high-speed rail infrastructure, several 
interesting papers have reached different conclusions. Janic (1993) appears to be among 
the first to develop a model of competition between the two modes concluding that high-
speed rail can compete with air transport over a relatively large range of distances (from 
400 to over 2,000 km). However, the model assumes that all demand is met and that the 
aim is to minimize total system costs for both passengers and transport operators. In 
analyzing a high-speed rail corridor between Los Angeles and San Fransisco, Levinson et 
al. (1997) utilize an engineering, full-cost approach to argue that high-speed rail 
infrastructure is significantly more costly than expanding air services and should not be 
assumed to substitute for air transport. De Rus and Inglada (1997) analyze the Madrid-
Sevilla link and reach similar conclusions to Levinson et al. (1997), arguing that an 
economic valuation of the project suggests that it should not have been constructed due to 
a negative net present valuation. In analyzing a Canadian high-speed rail corridor, Martin 
(1997) develops an economic cost-benefit analysis that includes externalities and 
concluded that an efficient infrastructure project may be rejected due to politically 
unacceptable inter-regional income transfers, suggesting that the federal government 
should play an active role in such instances. Van Exel et al. (2002) argue that an accurate 
cost-benefit analysis of TENs must consider both network effects and European value 
added. They specify that the high-speed rail link PBKAL (Paris-Brussels-Koln-
Amsterdam-London) has an expected economic return 25% higher that the sum of the 
independent national valuations. Gonzalez-Savignat (2004) develops a stated preference 
experimental design in order to analyze the potential attraction of a high-speed rail link 
from Madrid to Barcelona. Gonzalez-Savignat predicts a high substitutability between air 
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services and the rail link, if upgraded, is expected to achieve 40% market shares in the 
business sector and almost 60% in the leisure sector. de Rus and Nombela (2007) reach 
the conclusion that “high-speed rail investment is difficult to justify when the expected 
first year demand is below 8-10 million passengers for a line of 500 km” which they 
demonstrate is unlikely in the majority of transport corridors in Europe. Vickerman 
(1997) argued that 12 -15 million passengers would be required to ensure a viable rail 
operator. Martin and Nombela (2007) apply a gravity model to estimate trip demand for 
the year 2010 in Spain and then compute the parameters of a multinomial logit function. 
Roman et al. (2007) estimate modal choice based on mixed revealed and stated 
preference data on the Madrid-Barcelona corridor. Both Martin and Nombela (2007) and 
Roman et al. (2007) reach the conclusion that after upgrading the infrastructure, a high-
speed rail operator will attract approximately 25% of the passenger market share, a very 
similar conclusion to that of our case study (on average). 
 
The objective of this paper is to further develop the methodological framework analyzing 
the passenger transport market equilibria. The new elements of the present research 
comprise the expansion of player types and in-depth analysis of the social welfare 
function, including the infrastructure manager and government surpluses as well as the 
standard consumer and producer surpluses. In the game, three main transport operator 
types are defined: legacy hub-spoke (HS) networks, low cost carriers (LC) and high-
speed rail operators (R). We thus include three very different player types, which makes 
this model more realistic than the earlier studies. Each transport carrier operates in a 
deregulated market and maximizes profits. The rail infrastructure access charges are 
exogenous. Scenario based infrastructure pricing rules are used and the results in terms of 
changes in social welfare analyzed. Hence the major contribution of this research is to 
offer a new style of cost-benefit analysis that accounts for privatized transport operator 
behavior over a network, demonstrating their responses to government initiatives in terms 
of infrastructure provision and charging whilst accounting for both the environment and 
competition. Sichelschmidt (1999) argues that for reasons of moral hazard, a tax-financed 
European infrastructure fund should be rejected since the TEN justification is primarily 
non-economic rather distributional or environmental. He argues that the European Union 
role should be mainly in encouraging dialogue between relevant member states in order 
to ensure that spillovers between regions are recognized and positive consumer network 
externalities taken into account. The model framework developed here permits an 
analysis of all these relevant elements within an economic framework. Nijkamp (1995), 
utilizing a Pentagon prism of critical success factors, calls for an evaluation framework 
for infrastructure appraisal from a European perspective, clearly provided in this paper, 
which should play a key role in the organization and management of European railway 
companies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The profit functions of the three transport operator 
types are developed in Section 2. The different transport operators compete for demand, 
described in Section 3, using a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model, of the type 
depicted in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Anderson et al. (1996). Section 4 analyzes 
the European Union transport market under various scenarios for the year 2020. Section 5 
describes the outcomes with and without the additional infrastructure being proposed and 
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Section 6 draws a summary and conclusions. Appendix A specifies the Trans-European 
networks analyzed in the case study. Appendix B provides a more detailed analysis of the 
mathematics including derivatives and Appendix C specifies the complete 71 node air 
network and 54 node rail network with respective connections where applicable. 
 
2. Airline and High-Speed Rail Characteristics 
This section discusses the three types of profit maximizing transport operators, which 
entails developing three different best response functions based on the operator types’ 
individual objective functions. The low cost (LC) airlines choose a single aircraft type 
over all legs and, specify frequencies per leg and a single price per origin-destination 
market. Most LC airlines have a single aircraft type strategy to reduce maintenance costs 
and personnel training and do not attempt to distinguish between business and leisure 
travelers. LC airlines use yield management to maximize revenues by changing ticket 
prices over time, a strategy designed to capture as much of the consumer surplus as 
possible. Including this strategy in the model would substantially increase complexity, as 
the number of decision variables would increase greatly as would the search for an 
equilibrium outcome in a repeated game. Therefore, this has been considered an 
interesting potential extension but beyond the scope of this paper. Prices are computed 
per leg, hence a traveler choosing to fly with a LC carrier over two legs will be required 
to purchase two separate tickets. The hub-spoke (HS) carriers, based on their hub network 
decision, are free to choose various aircraft sizes and frequencies over their legs and two 
sets of prices, one for business and one for leisure, over all origin-destination pairs, 
whether the flight is direct or not. In this case, prices include tickets which may involve 
up to three legs, if the traveler is required to pass through one or two hubs, dependent on 
the network that the airline has chosen a-priori.  
 
A single high-speed rail operator serves the entire rail network. Since there is no 
competition between rail operators in our model (and in practice), and there are no 
complementary routes in the model, a single operator suffices to capture the general 
picture. We explicitly do not consider the case where the infrastructure operator is 
vertically integrated with the rail operator. From an economic perspective one might 
argue that vertical integration would benefit passengers, given that there is only one rail 
operator (Economides and Salop, 1992) however vertical unbundling is one of the key 
elements of the European Union railway policy (de Rus and Nombela (2007)). The rail 
operator chooses the number of seats on their rolling stock per leg, frequencies per leg 
and business and leisure prices per origin-destination pair, based on the relevant 
infrastructure. The number of legs per trip is track dependent and based on the shortest 
distance between each origin and destination, which consists of a maximum of 15 legs in 
the case study analyzed.  
 
2.1 Decision Variables 
 
In order to characterize each individual operator, we define their profit functions, which 
consist of revenues less costs. The revenues depend on market share, which is a function 
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of price pijsa, frequency fka and average travel time from origin city center to destination 
city center of the individual operator and all competitors in the market, whether operating 
a direct or indirect service. The subscripts are explained below. The cost element is a 
function of plane or train size, measured in the number of seats Ska, frequency, distance 
and various other parameters, such as infrastructure charges and taxes, dependent on the 
scenario to be analyzed. The decision variables that each operator faces include: 
 
pijsa  price to travel from i to j via operator a per traveler type s 
Ska  number of seats on aircraft/train per leg k for operator a 
fka frequency of flights on leg k via operator a 
 
 
The cost and profit functions which are based on these decision variables are explained in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. The market share model is described in Section 3, the 
methodology for defining the airline networks in Section 4.2 and the total number of 
decision variables per operator type in Section 4.3. 
 
2.2 Cost Functions  
 
Swan and Adler (2006) found that great circle distance, GCDij, and the number of seats 
on an aircraft, Ska, are the two main factors affecting aircraft trip costs.  Two market-
based equations were developed based on average length of haul, which incorporate 
aircraft size. Equation (1) gives the cost function for medium to short haul markets (i.e. 
less than 5,000 kilometers). Equation (2) provides the cost function for long haul markets 
(more than 5,000 kilometers).  
 
)104)(722(0190 ++=  S  GCD. $ C kaijshortka       (1) 
)211)(2200(01150 ++=  S  GCD. $ C kaijlongka      (2) 
 
The values in equations (1) and (2) have been multiplied by 2.2 in order to translate the 
dollar values into euros at 2001 prices and to reflect the cost of a return trip. The LC 
airlines are usually active in short haul regional markets and deliberately purchase or 
lease a single aircraft type2, therefore the seat size decision variables are limited (SLC). It 
has also been shown in Swan and Adler (2006) that low cost airlines save $50 per flight 
due to faster turnaround times and lower airport charges due to the use of smaller, 
secondary airports and lower marketing costs due to greater reliance on online services. 
Consequently, the HS player type enjoys greater freedom (more decision variables) and 
serves more markets but suffers from a higher cost structure than its LC competitors. 
 
                                                 
2
 One might expect that with the Open Aviation Area, LC airlines may enter transatlantic routes. As there is 
no agreement yet in the literature whether this will take place, we do not include this option in the analysis. 
The case study presented here focuses on the results of investments in high-speed rail. 
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The high-speed rail operator cost function consists of a rolling stock cost, operating cost 
per train kilometer and access charge for infrastructure use per train kilometer, as defined 
in equation (3).  
( )( )∑∑ ++





=
k
ijkr
ac
k
oc
k
k
krkr GCDfαα  Sf RS Total Cost 2)450(2     (3) 
where: 
r high-speed rail operator 
RS fixed cost of purchasing a single 450 seat train amortized 
oc
kα  operating cost per train kilometer per leg k 
ac
kα  access charge per kilometer per leg k 
 
The first element of the cost function computes the rolling stock capital investment. It is 
assumed that per 300 kilometer stretch, two round trips a day will require a single train 
(this is a very conservative estimate, suggesting that the costs may be higher than really 
necessary). It is also assumed that the cost of purchasing a train is linear in the number of 
seats, ranging from 15 to 30 million € for a 450 to 900 seat train (de Rus and Nash 
(2007)). The second element computes the variable costs of running the train as a 
function of the distance traveled, in terms of operating costs and access charges. 
 
The train size is restricted to lie between 450 and 900 seats, which will appear as a 
constraint in the model and the plane sizes are restricted to lie between 150 and 401 
seats3, as demonstrated in equation (4). 
 
900   450  ,401   150  ,401   150 ≤≤≤≤≤≤ krLCkHS SSS      (4) 
 
                                                 
3
  Regional jets have not been considered in this model since their cost functions may be radically different. 
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2.3 Profit Functions 
 
The generalized profit function for the different operators (a) is presented in equation (5). 
 
( ) ( )
a
i
ji
j k
akakaijkaijsaij
s
ijsaijakaijsaa
,S,fp
,,f,SGCDCpd,TP,TTTfM Max
kakaijsa
ψχpi










−= ∑∑ ∑∑
≠
(5) 
 
where 
Mijsa  market share of demand between (i,j) for traveler type s with operator a 
TTTija  total trip time from center of city i to center of city j with operator a 
TPijsa total price to travel from center of city i to that of city j for traveler type s 
with operator a 
dij maximum potential demand from i to j 
χa  environmental charge paid by operator a to government 
aψ  100 - tax % on profits paid to government by operator a, if profits are 
positive 
 
The revenue function depends on market share, the maximal origin-destination demand 
matrix and relevant prices. In turn, market share is a function of the frequency, 
generalized trip time and total price of the various alternatives available from origin i to 
destination j. The origin-destination demand matrix was computed for the year 2020 
based on data received from the SCENES project (SCENES, 2006). 
 
3. Market Share Model 
This part of the model will enable passengers to participate in the game by choosing 
between the available alternatives or not traveling at all. The passengers will choose an 
alternative based on the total trip time, the total price and the log of frequency (which acts 
as a proxy for level of service (Hansen (1990), Pels (2000))) on all modes. According to 
Mandel et al. (1997), a more appropriate Box-Cox logit model would have been 
appropriate but the data with respect to socio-economic variables was not available. 
 
a∈{NT,R,LC,HS} where we assume that the choice set includes several possible airlines 
in each category (LC and HS), one rail company and a no-travel or road alternative 
βνa weight in logit model setting importance of parameters, ν = 0,1,2,3 per operator 
category a 
Uijsa deterministic utility of traveler type s taking path (i,j) with operator a 
µs scale parameter in nested logit per traveler type s 
m mode of transport, namely air or non-air (including rail and the no-travel 
alternative) 
Nm nest of operators belonging to mode m 
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Specifically, passengers choose the alternative that yields the highest utility. Utility 
consists of a systematic part (equation 6) and a random part. Equation (6) defines the 
systematic utility of passenger type s traveling with operator a from i to j. The utility 
function includes a constant value per mode, the total price to travel from the center of 
city i to that of city j and the log of the minimum frequency along the legs traveled. 
Hansen (1990) argued that the logarithmic form of service frequency is preferable 
because “one would expect diminishing returns with respect to the gain in service 
attractiveness from adding additional flights”. Since the trip may be indirect, only the leg 
with the lowest frequency is considered because this represents the bottleneck in the total 
trip time. An approximation of the minimization function is applied in order to solve the 
objective function and details are presented in Appendix B (Adler (2005)). 
 
( )kaR       kaijsaaijaaaijsa fβTPβTTTββU ija∈+++= minln3210     (6) 
 
Given that the random utility components are assumed to be independently and 
identically Gumbel distributed, we define the nested multinomial logit model for the 
individual operators’ market share as follows (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)). 
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The alternatives have been split into two nests, one air nest consisting of all hub-spoke 
and low cost alternatives and the second nest including high-speed rail and the no travel / 
road alternatives. Equation (7) defines the probability of a type s passenger choosing the 
air nest, and equation (8) defines the conditional probability of a type s traveler choosing 
operator a, given the choice of the ‘air’ nest. The market share of an alternative is the 
product of these two equations. The direct elasticity of the market share of a specific 
alternative, for example in the air nest, with respect to the three variables defined in the 
utility function, xijsa, is defined in equation (9): 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )airMairaM
x
x
airMairaM
airaM
x
x
airaM
ijsijs
ijsa
ijsa
ijsijs
ijs
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ijsa
ijsairaM
x
ijs
ijsa δ
δ
δ
δ
ε ==
,
,),
 (9) 
 
Using (9), we calculate elasticities for each ijsa-combination. Since the combination set is 
very large, we only report the elasticities per passenger type and per alternative. The 
market share weighted average is presented in Equation (10). 
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Finally, the welfare function in Equation (11) is defined as the total consumer surplus 
(maximum expected utility defined in monetary terms), producer surplus (total profits 
from all operators), government surplus (tax revenues less external costs) and 
infrastructure manager surplus (revenue from rail operator less maintenance and 
construction costs). Small and Rosen (1981) provide a detailed methodological account 
of welfare economic computation with respect to discrete choice modeling. 
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where 
Eka environmental costs produced per flight/train trip on leg k per operator a 
ζk exogenous access charge paid by rail operator to infrastructure manager 
per leg k 
κk  maintenance costs to maintain rail track per leg k 
FCk fixed cost of upgrading track k to high-speed standards 
 
The assumption in the base scenario is that all track exists at varying speeds based on 
expected standards by 2020. Consequently, the infrastructure manager’s fixed costs 
consist only of the four TENs to be analyzed. The resulting upgrades, in terms of speed, 
are specified in Table 7. Government surplus consists of two types of taxes, an 
environmental charge per flight/train service and a corporate tax on profits. The taxes 
may be positive or negative, representing either costs to the transport operators (who may 
then pass on the costs to the passengers) or subsidies. A marginal cost of public funds has 
been evaluated at 1.2 (Calthrop et al. (2008)). In addition, the externalities caused by the 
generation of transport have been monetarized (Eka) according to the mode of transport 
and includes marginal environmental, accident and noise charges (INFRAS/IWW 
(2004)). In the INFRAS/IWW report, the air transport charge is computed as a function 
of the journey length, with a 284 km flight (Paris - Brussels) costing €0.048 per 
passenger/km and a 1,045 km flight  (Paris – Vienna) costing €0.029 per passenger/km, 
since the majority of the environmental cost occurs on landing and take-off. This has 
been linearized to compute a cost per journey length, dropping to a minimum of €0.01 per 
passenger/km beyond 1,800 km, equivalent to the cost of a high-speed rail journey, as 
argued in Janic (2003). 
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4. European Network Case Study 
 
This section discusses the demand zones to be analyzed and the general parameters of the 
European case study. Subsequently, the air and rail transport networks are discussed in 
detail as well as the decision variables involved. Section 5 describes the results drawing 
from this case.  
 
4.1 Demand Zones and General Parameters of the Model 
The model requires maximum potential demand flows between zones as input. The 
network to be analyzed includes 71 zones, three of which represent traffic flow to 
America, Africa and the Far East. All 27 E.U. countries are represented, some more 
disaggregated than others in order to cover the train network in greater detail. Table 1 
presents the breakdown of countries into zones and Appendix C specifies all zone 
descriptions (based on territorial units for statistics (NUTS) regions 1 and 2 aggregation 
levels) and the complete set of rail connections.  
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Zones 
Number of 
Zones 
Country  Number of 
Zones 
Country 
1 Norway  7 Austria 
1 Poland  1 Belgium 
1 Portugal  1 Switzerland 
1 Sweden  1 Czech 
1 Slovenia  16 Germany 
1 Slovakia  1 Denmark 
1 Turkey  8 Spain 
1 United Kingdom  1 Finland 
1 Baltics  12 France 
1 Russia  1 Greece 
1 Balkans  3 Hungary 
1 Cyprus-Malta  1 Ireland 
1 Far East  12 Italy 
1 Middle East & Africa  1 Luxembourg 
1 America  1 Netherlands 
 
Vickerman (1997) argues that a key issue for competitive analysis requires inclusion of 
the pattern of total trip times. Gonzalez-Savignat (2004) goes so far as to argue that 
separate parameter values should be computed for access times, however this has proven 
difficult empirically, hence we have summed the total trip time. The calculation of the 
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total trip time for each origin-destination pair is split into the net trip time, based on the 
distance between two directly linked nodes divided by the velocity of the mode, with an 
additional takeoff/landing time, time spent at the airport/train station and time required to 
access and egress the airport/train station and layover time spent at a hub if necessary. 
The trip times summarized in Table 3 may be somewhat arbitrary, but they reflect the 
difference between business and leisure passengers (business passengers place a higher 
value on their time), and the fact that LC airlines usually choose to fly from secondary 
airports that are often located further from the city center. When the origin-destination is 
a direct link, the net trip time and the extra constants are simply summed to compute the 
total trip time. If the trip is indirect, the total trip time is computed by summing the net 
trip times of each direct leg that would be taken in order to arrive at the destination, with 
additional time constants computed at each end. This is to ensure that each passenger 
only accesses the airport or train station from which s/he departs and arrives. 
 
The assumptions with regard to average velocity, access times, airport times and 
takeoff/landing times are summarized in Table 3, per passenger type and transport mode 
and are relevant to the specific European case study analyzed in this paper. 
 
Table 3: Trip Time Computation in Hours 
 Hub-Spoke Low Cost Train 
Takeoff/Landing time 0.25  0.25  0  
Access Time 1 2 0.5 
Airport Processing Time-Business 0.5  0.5  0  
Airport Processing Time-Leisure 1.5  0.5  0  
Airport Processing Time-International 1 – business 
2 - leisure 
  
Switching time at hub/station 1.5  2 0.25  
Average Velocity 740 km/h 740 km/h depends on route 
infrastructure 
 
Table 4 provides summary data on average great circle distances for direct trips and the 
respective maximum demand per day based on expected values for the year 2020 
(SCENES (2006)). 
 
Table 4: Average Distances and Maximum Demand (with number of relevant routes in brackets) 
 Distance (km) Demand (pax per day) 
  Business Leisure 
Europe  1,103 (2701) 207 (2591) 323 (2607) 
 
Non-European 5,015 (213) 436 (205) 104 (213) 
 
Since rail speeds are substantially lower than air (lying between 130 and 280 km/h 
compared to 740 km/h for air travel), we expect the real competition between the two 
modes to exist in the 300 to 750 kilometer market. 
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The parameter values in the logit function per traveler type s, dependent on whether the 
destinations are intercontinental or international, are presented in Table 5 and are based 
on Pels et al. (2000). 
 
Table 5: Logit Parameters 
 Europe Business Leisure Intn. Business Leisure 
ln (log frequency)  1.16 0.89  0.928 0.356 
Total Price  -0.004 -0.01  -0.0016 -0.004 
Total Trip time  -0.15 -0.02  -0.01 -0.004 
Inter-nest Heterogeneity   0.77 0.68    
 
4.2 Air & Rail Networks 
In the case study, three hub-spoke internationals, two low cost regionals and one high-
speed rail operator have been defined. The hub-spoke networks roughly represent the 
three alliances currently growing around the world, namely Oneworld, Star Alliance and 
Skyteam. It is assumed that each alliance will organize two hubs within Europe and use 
one of them as the international gateway, and one as a regional hub as presented in Table 
6. 
 
Table 6: Airline Hubs 
 Hub 1 Hub 2 
Hub-Spoke 1 Paris Prague 
Hub-Spoke 2 London Budapest 
Hub-Spoke 3 Frankfurt Poland 
Low Cost 1 London  
Low Cost 2 Berlin  
 
For example, as depicted in Figure 2, the Skyteam alliance is assumed to utilize Paris as 
the international gateway (dotted lines represent international flights) and Prague as the 
regional hub.  
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Figure 2: Paris-Prague Hub-Spoke International Network  
 
 
Partially balanced, demand weighted distance was defined in the objective function of an 
allocation, integer linear program in order to develop a basic network for each of the HS 
airlines. There are many possible methods of producing a connected HS network, the 
most direct of which is to simply connect spoke nodes to a chosen set of hub nodes 
according to minimum distance. Alternatively a more balanced solution could be sought 
as presented in the integer linear program in equation (12). 
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where  i1  hub number 1 
 i2  hub number 2 
 ω1-ω2 variable measuring level of balance of solution 
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If the balance parameter, φ, equals zero, model (12) minimizes distance and may result in 
an almost pure HS system i.e. a single hub. Were one of the hubs to be geographically 
further away from other nodes, for example London, almost all spokes may be attached to 
the secondary hub. Since the hubs are supposed to represent the “center” of the network, 
with all other nodes acting as spokes, it was determined that a second solution, whereby 
both hubs have a reasonable number of connections, could also be considered. In 
addition, it may be true that no single hub could carry all the demand, since large airports 
around the world suffer severe congestion at present. Thus the integer linear program 
included the balance parameter which, if large enough, would ensure a completely 
balanced network, such that approximately half the nodes are connected to one hub and 
the remainder to the second hub. For φ between this value and zero, we may attain 
various different solutions. An alternative formulation could, for example, minimize the 
total passenger kilometers traveled or the total number of travelers required to fly over 
more than one-leg journeys. The distances between the nodes could also be included in 
the objective function in order to minimize the total number of passenger kilometers 
traveled.  
 
The two low cost airlines, assumed to fly within Europe only utilizing a pure, star 
network, are based in London and Berlin, in order to represent the likely number of 
regional airlines expected to survive by 2020. The high-speed railway network is depicted 
in Figure 3. The basic assumption of this case study is that the entire rail network will 
exist by 2020, but the four TENs will consist of conventional rail only, unless the projects 
are undertaken.  Data from a railway network database used for the modelling work was 
supplied by Büro für Raumforschung, Raumplanung und Geoinformation (fRRG, 2006). 
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Figure 3: (Mostly) High-Speed Rail Network within Europe 2020 
 
 
Table 7 identifies which parts of the TEN links under scrutiny exist in the base scenario 
and their presumed speeds after the improvements. Consequently, the upgrading of track 
covers Germany and Austria in TEN 1, France and Spain in TEN 3, the French-Italian 
connection to Slovenia in TEN 6 and the French-German-Austrian links in TEN 17. 
 
Table 7: TENs Upgrades 
     Speed in km 
TENs From  To  without 
TENs 
with 
Tens 
1 DE/09 Berlin  DE/10 Brandenburg and Saxony 130 211 
 DE/10 Brandenburg and Saxony DE/16 Halle  130 200 
 DE/16 Halle  DE/06 Mittelfranken    130 249 
 DE/06 Mittelfranken DE/05 Oberbayern 130 235 
 DE/05 Oberbayern AT/06 Tirol and Vorarlberg 130 215 
 AT/06 Tirol and Vorarlberg IT/04 Bolzano-Bozen 130 280 
 IT/04 Bolzano-Bozen IT/05 Trento 130 280 
 IT/05 Trento IT/07 Veneto  130 280 
3 FR/09 Rhône-Alpes and Auvergne ES/04 Central Spain 130 280 
 ES/04 Central Spain ES/02 Aragón 130 280 
 ES/02 Aragón ES/03 Madrid 130 280 
6 FR/09 Rhône-Alpes and Auvergne IT/01 Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
130 223 
 IT/01 Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
IT/03 Lombardia 130 280 
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     Speed in km 
TENs From  To  without 
TENs 
with 
Tens 
 IT/03 Lombardia IT/06 Veneto  130 280 
 IT/06 Veneto  IT/07 Friuli-Venezia Giulia  130 280 
 IT/07 Friuli-Venezia Giulia  SI/01 Slovenija 130 189 
17 FR/01 Île de France FR/04 Lorraine and Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché) 
130 258 
 FR/04 Lorraine and Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché) 
FR/05 Alsace  130 280 
 FR/05 Alsace  DE/02 Karlsruhe  130 257 
 DE/02 Karlsruhe  DE/01 Stuttgart  130 280 
 DE/01 Stuttgart  DE/04 Tübingen 130 280 
 DE/04 Tübingen DE/08 Schwaben 130 280 
 DE/08 Schwaben DE/05 Oberbayern 130 200 
 DE/05 Oberbayern AT/05 Salzburg  130 202 
 AT/05 Salzburg  AT/04 Oberöterreich 130 233 
 AT/04 Oberöterreich AT/02 Wien 130 232 
 
Another issue that is high on the policy agenda is the question of whether or not an EU 
infrastructure fund is required to finance (rail) infrastructure, and, if the answer is 
positive, the most appropriate source for such financing. Infrastructure costs are usually 
very high, so it is proving difficult to finance the TENs privately; private operators of 
high-speed or standard rail often find it difficult to break even, even without covering the 
infrastructure costs (in fact, in some scenarios with a relatively high access charge 
analyzed in Section 5, the net operating result of the rail operator is negative, indicating 
that the private operator may not be able to bear the infrastructure cost). It is implicitly 
assumed in the paper that the infrastructure operator may receive a subsidy. We 
distinguish scenarios with a low, marginal cost access charge and scenarios with a higher, 
average cost access charge. When the access charge is close to the marginal cost, the rail 
operator does not pay the full cost of the infrastructure, in which case the authorities must 
cover part of the infrastructure cost with the remainder left to the rail operator. When the 
access charge is high, the rail operator pays for a large share of the infrastructure cost. 
Furthermore, in the modeling exercise, the fixed cost of the TENs (Table 8) is known, so 
we can compare this to the revenue drawn from taxes and tolls. In the model we consider 
scenarios with taxes on corporate profits and environmental tolls. All of these revenues 
may be seen as a source of money for subsidies, alongside an EU infrastructure fund, 
although it should be noted that ideally the objective of the environmental toll is not to 
generate revenues, but to optimize the level of environmental damage i.e. reduce the 
damage to a level which is consistent with welfare maximization. Therefore, we can 
evaluate whether the infrastructure cost is covered by i) the access charge and/or ii) the 
taxes and toll revenues. Another source of capital for the EU infrastructure fund might be 
the monopoly rents, if any, of the rail operator, although there are two complications. 
Firstly, the existence of monopoly rents means that economic inefficiency exists and 
welfare is not being maximized. When we use these rents to finance capacity, we more or 
less accept the fact that welfare is not maximized and finance a level of capacity that also 
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may not be optimal. Secondly, it is likely that in practice the high-speed rail operator will 
be regulated thus reducing the level of monopoly rents.  
 
Table 8 specifies the net present value infrastructure investment costs of each of the four 
projects under analysis assuming an expected economic life of 40 years and a discount 
rate of 5%, as recommended by the European Commission (1997). 
 
Table 8: Cost of TENs Upgrading per Project 
TENs Total Cost 
(M€) 
Cost per day 
(NPV, M€) 
1 31,925 5.015 
3 12,506 1.964 
6 32,839 5.158 
17 8,190 1.286 
 
4.3 Decision Variables 
Table 9 describes the number of variables and constraints involved in the mathematical 
analysis per player type. The objective function is highly non-linear but all constraints are 
linear. The LC carrier constraints require ticket prices on indirect links to be the sum of 
the two relevant ticket prices, reflecting the fact that LC airlines do not offer indirect 
tickets. The rail operator constraints require business tickets to be at least as expensive as 
leisure tickets for the same origin-destination combination. Finally, all plane and train 
sizes are limited to upper and lower bounds (equation (4)). 
 
Table 9: Decision Variables for 71 Zone Network 
Rail 
54 nodes & 68 arcs 
Low Cost 
68 nodes 
Hub-Spokes 
71 nodes 
 
   Variables 
2862 2278 4970 Price (p) 
68 67 70 Frequency (f) 
68 1 70 Plane/Train Size (S) 
2998 2346 5110 Total 
   Constraints 
136 2 140 Plane/Train Bounds 
 2211  Sum of Prices 
1431   Business Prices ≥ Leisure Prices 
1567 2213 140 Total 
 
The problem has been solved using KNITRO, having programmed the first derivatives 
for all variables. Clearly, the solution found may only be locally optimal, hence the multi-
start command has been applied, increasing the probability of finding one of the global 
solutions. There are many potential equilibria solution outcomes to this case study, 
depending on the order of the players when computing the solution, and given the non-
linearity of the mathematical model and the simple assumptions as to the high-speed rail 
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operator’s structure. We therefore provide here generalizations and averages rather than 
suggest that we can specifically identify which operators are likely to be more successful 
than others. It should be noted that solution outcomes were always found, though cannot 
be guaranteed. All solutions, depending on the order of players, proved to be of very 
similar magnitudes. 
 
4. Scenarios and Social Welfare Function 
In this section, we present four scenario solutions, with and without the upgraded TENs 
routes for a relatively low rail access charge of €2 per kilometer and a relatively high 
charge of 10 € per kilometer. These numbers draw on results from two European funded 
projects, GRACE (2005) and UNITE (2002). After an analysis of these results, we then 
present the social welfare computations drawing on these solutions and discuss in greater 
detail the differences between the scenarios. Finally, we will discuss the effects of 
environmental charging on the potential transport equilibrium.  
 
The results presented here consist of a series of tables specifying averages over all the 
networks and have been computed based on weighted market shares (equation (10)). 
Therefore, occasionally business and leisure prices for low cost airlines appear to be 
different despite the fact that for each origin-destination pair, these airlines have been 
restricted to offering a single price. Clearly the airlines have taken advantage of the fact 
that certain links carry a higher percentage of business travelers resulting in a higher tariff 
on these origin-destination markets. The airlines are free to choose an aircraft with a 
minimum of 150 seats and a maximum of 401. From the solutions presented in tables 10, 
it is clear that the larger aircraft are chosen on the international links. Finally, it should be 
noted that the rail operator pricing policy was restricted to ensure that business prices are 
at least as large as leisure prices. Without this set of constraints, in some instances, the 
rail operator attempted to improve market share by offering the business traveler a lower 
price (the business traveler is more sensitive to time and frequency). Finally, for lack of 
space, we have been forced to use weighted averages, and given the very subtle 
differences between the scenarios, this may appear to produce rather similar results. 
However, the extended detail in tables 11 to 14 highlight some of the larger differences 
that averages tend to smooth. Indeed, there would appear to be substantial competition in 
the German region between a Hub-Spoke (Lufthansa), Low Cost carrier (Air Berlin) and 
the HSR operator, leading to only partial use of the upgraded high-speed rail 
infrastructure along TEN 17. 
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Table 10a: No TENs Upgrades and a Rail Access Charge of €2 per kilometer 
Europe  HS1 HS2 HS3 LC1 LC2 TN Int HS1 HS2 HS3 
Primary hub Paris  England  Frankfurt  England  Berlin    Paris  England  Frankfurt  
Secondary hub Prague  Hungary  Poland          Prague  Hungary  Poland  
Profit 11,058,822 18,801,365 7,560,270 7,374,525 5,494,666 13,818,531 
    
Business Price 527 577 527 360 381 240 
 
1195 1197 1196 
Leisure Price 262 266 259 269 375 134 
 
697 668 691 
Frequency 19 21 20 9 10 15 
 
18 21 23 
Plane/Train Size 167 176 164 199 207 479 
 
285 330 220 
Business market share 0.175 0.160 0.174 0.160 0.155 0.176 
 
0.298 0.321 0.323 
Leisure market share 0.197 0.196 0.203 0.119 0.072 0.214 
 
0.253 0.285 0.262 
Load Factor 0.8560 0.7942 0.8559 0.8191 0.7381 0.6147 
 
0.9609 0.9148 0.9485 
Business Frequency Elasticity 0.4631 0.4919 0.4630 0.4622 0.4124 0.3401 
 
0.3274 0.3190 0.3004 
Leisure  Frequency Elasticity 0.3603 0.3676 0.3584 0.3754 0.3494 0.2521 
 
0.1357 0.1348 0.1313 
Business Price Elasticity -0.7973 -0.9075 -0.7968 -0.7594 -0.7317 -0.2464 
 
-0.6014 -0.5885 -0.5796 
Leisure  Price Elasticity -1.1179 -1.2255 -1.1122 -1.9429 -1.9110 -0.2888 
 
-2.6653 -2.3661 -2.6169 
 
Table 10b: TENs Upgrades and a Rail Access Charge of €2 per kilometer 
Europe  HS1 HS2 HS3 LC1 LC2 TN Int HS1 HS2 HS3 
Primary hub 
Paris England Frankfurt England Berlin   Paris England Frankfurt 
Secondary hub 
Prague Hungary Poland     Prague Hungary Poland 
Profit 10,268,976 18,359,735 8,679,529 7,177,828 5,452,489 28,674,513  
   
Business Price 528 584 528 359 382 382  1196 1197 1196 
Leisure Price 266 269 265 270 379 211  706 670 701 
Frequency 19 21 19 12 11 21  21 21 21 
Plane/Train Size 164 169 165 174 198 528  224 325 243 
Business market share 0.173 0.154 0.164 0.172 0.151 0.187  0.313 0.314 0.315 
Leisure market share 0.197 0.196 0.197 0.130 0.072 0.209  0.257 0.282 0.259 
Load Factor 0.8446 0.7945 0.8585 0.8184 0.7424 0.5009 
 
0.9638 0.9182 0.9525 
Business Frequency Elasticity 0.4617 0.4949 0.4659 0.4496 0.4217 0.3148 
 
0.3170 0.3192 0.3103 
Leisure  Frequency Elasticity 0.3577 0.3664 0.3582 0.3658 0.3516 0.2380 
 
0.1344 0.1346 0.1323 
Business Price Elasticity -0.7983 -0.9274 -0.8032 -0.7527 -0.7392 -0.2336 
 
-0.5910 -0.5918 -0.5872 
Leisure  Price Elasticity -1.1207 -1.2712 -1.1234 -1.9319 -1.9168 -0.3001 
 
-2.6688 -2.3834 -2.6481 
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Table 10c: No TENs Upgrades and a Rail Access Charge of €10 per kilometer 
Europe  HS1 HS2 HS3 LC1 LC2 TN Int HS1 HS2 HS3 
Primary hub Paris  England  Frankfurt  England  Berlin    Paris  England  Frankfurt  
Secondary hub Prague  Hungary  Poland          Prague  Hungary  Poland  
Profit 11,653,553 21,661,062 8,883,522 8,822,376 6,300,958 -56,795 
 
   
Business Price 531 584 531 361 381 3 
 
1195 1197 1196 
Leisure Price 265 269 263 270 376 2 
 
700 668 695 
Frequency 21 23 21 12 12 0 
 
21 22 22 
Plane/Train Size 165 173 165 184 204 452 
 
225 328 236 
Business market share 0.202 0.188 0.193 0.204 0.183 0.029 
 
0.306 0.321 0.317 
Leisure market share 0.225 0.228 0.228 0.148 0.085 0.086 
 
0.255 0.285 0.260 
Load Factor 0.8787 0.8012 0.8811 0.8252 0.7476 0.9793 
 
0.9648 0.9138 0.9553 
Business Frequency Elasticity 0.4538 0.4802 0.4495 0.4316 0.3913 0.5096 
 
0.3178 0.3196 0.3094 
Leisure  Frequency Elasticity 0.3546 0.3593 0.3486 0.3606 0.3372 0.3525 
 
0.1346 0.1346 0.1323 
Business Price Elasticity -0.7869 -0.8958 -0.7852 -0.7380 -0.7186 -0.0270 
 
-0.5963 -0.5873 -0.5841 
Leisure  Price Elasticity -1.1040 -1.2148 -1.0974 -1.9192 -1.8970 -0.0281 
 
-2.6643 -2.3674 -2.6309 
 
Table 10d: TENs Upgrades and a Rail Access Charge of €10 per kilometer 
Europe  HS1 HS2 HS3 LC1 LC2 TN Int HS1 HS2 HS3 
Primary hub Paris  England  Frankfurt  England  Berlin    Paris  England  Frankfurt  
Secondary hub Prague  Hungary  Poland          Prague  Hungary  Poland  
Profit 11,157,891 21,139,502 8,138,777 8,838,369 5,889,899 -55,453     
Business Price 532 580 532 363 380 2  1195 1197 1196 
Leisure Price 261 267 260 271 373 1  692 666 689 
Frequency 21 24 22 12 12 0  21 22 24 
Plane/Train Size 165 171 165 182 200 452   227 325 231 
Business market share 0.2 0.189 0.197 0.201 0.183 0.03  0.307 0.318 0.32 
Leisure market share 0.226 0.228 0.231 0.145 0.085 0.085  0.258 0.286 0.262 
Load Factor 0.8686 0.8064 0.8626 0.8216 0.7584 0.9843  0.9668 0.9163 0.9437 
Business Frequency Elasticity 0.4536 0.4798 0.4481 0.4333 0.3933 0.5098  0.3206 0.3201 0.306 
Leisure  Frequency Elasticity 0.3542 0.3594 0.3483 0.3624 0.3383 0.3534  0.135 0.1349 0.132 
Business Price Elasticity -0.7841 -0.8912 -0.7839 -0.7408 -0.7213 -0.0264  -0.5959 -0.5901 -0.5804 
Leisure  Price Elasticity -1.0949 -1.1834 -1.0925 -1.9257 -1.9001 -0.0278   -2.6471 -2.3555 -2.612 
 
These results suggest that five airlines can be supported by forecasted 2020 demand given 
the current expected cost structures. Indeed, the existence or lack thereof of the rail 
option has little effect on average on the air transport operators’ decision variables, 
including frequencies and tariffs. The major points to be drawn from tables 10 include the 
following: 
 
1) The strongest competitors of the high-speed rail operator include the second LC 
airline, operating out of Berlin, and the third HS airline, based in Frankfurt. As the 
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program cycles between the operators, these three require the most time to 
converge.  
2) The high-speed rail operator achieves higher profits with the TENs upgrades 
under the €2 per kilometer access charge scenario, through higher frequencies on 
average which permit higher tariffs without the loss of market share. Furthermore, 
the lower trip times enable the operator to charge as much as the LC airlines, at 
least for the business travelers (the rail operator splits the pricing between the two 
core markets, whereas the LC airlines charge a single fare). The rail operator 
cannot achieve profitability under the €10 per kilometer access charge scenario, 
indicating a private operator cannot bear relatively high infrastructure costs and 
will utilize very few of the links. 
 
Under further scrutiny, some substantial differences appear when the rail operator is 
running with or without the upgrades under the lower access charge. For example, many 
of the trips to Madrid with very low frequencies prior to the upgrade, increase 
dramatically afterwards (to 2 trains an hour). On the other hand, some of the frequencies 
to Stuttgart and Karlsruhe have been reduced to almost nothing, from ten trains per day. 
Prices have also increased in certain areas and decreased in others, for example from 
Slovenia to France and the United Kingdom to Southern Italy, rail tariffs dropped in order 
to encourage longer distance demand on services that have already been justified by 
shorter origin-destination markets. In Table 11, increases in tariffs are documented prior 
to the upgrade and afterwards, identifying multiple markets in which the train can better 
challenge air transport in terms of trip times, hence the HSR alternative becomes more 
competitive and is able to charge higher fares.  
 
Table 11: 15 Largest Rail Price Increases as a Result of TENs Upgrades 
Business  Price (€)  Leisure  Price (€)  
Origin Destination no upgrade with TENs % Change Origin Destination no upgrade with TENs % Change 
Central Italy  Liguria  113 590 420.19% Aragon  Schwaben  10 63 525.82% 
Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 
Central 
Spain  59 296 405.99% Aragon  
Bremen and 
Lower Saxony  32 177 445.31% 
Portugal  
Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 93 376 306.35% Central Spain  Schwaben  23 114 399.97% 
Liguria  
Central 
Spain  109 412 278.28% Central Italy  Liguria  65 284 337.67% 
Portugal  Madrid  69 249 262.48% 
Rhône-Alpes  
and Auvergne Alsace  45 190 327.12% 
Rhône-Alpes  
and Auvergne Alsace  164 578 253.27% Catalonia  
Bremen and 
Lower Saxony  70 273 289.19% 
Bolzano-
Bozen  Catalonia  128 432 239.07% Portugal  Madrid  43 157 263.88% 
Rhône-Alpes  
and Auvergne Schwaben  32 108 235.23% Catalonia  Madrid  9 29 238.49% 
Liguria  
Rheinland 
and 
Westphalia  77 253 227.23% 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia  
Rheinland 
and 
Westphalia  36 120 235.89% 
Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur Aragon  57 184 221.78% 
United 
Kingdom  Madrid  11 32 200.52% 
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Business  Price (€)  Leisure  Price (€)  
Origin Destination no upgrade with TENs % Change Origin Destination no upgrade with TENs % Change 
Piemonte and 
Valle 
d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
Rheinland 
and 
Westphalia  130 412 215.95% Madrid  
North East 
and North 
West Spain  11 30 167.55% 
West France  Schwaben  23 73 214.07% South Spain  
Brandenburg 
and Saxony  62 161 158.15% 
Madrid  
North East 
and North 
West Spain  45 137 204.63% 
Franche-
Comté Oberöterreich 82 212 157.24% 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia  
Île de 
France 95 288 203.49% 
Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur Central Spain  58 148 153.99% 
Aragon  
Bremen 
and Lower 
Saxony and  82 246 199.90% 
Lorraine and 
Luxembourg 
(Grand-
Duché) Oberöterreich 57 144 151.67% 
 
The literature on competition between air and high-speed rail is rather limited. Steer 
Davies Gleave (2006) concluded that high-speed rail captures a large market share in 
markets where passengers would have traveled by air, if the high-speed alternative was 
not available, and that in certain markets, e.g. Germany, aviation prices may drop below 
high-speed rail prices, all of which proved true in this case study. When travel time is 
significantly reduced due to the opening of a high-speed rail link, the rail operator 
increases prices to maximize profits, without significantly compromising its competitive 
position. Steer Davies Gleave come to a similar conclusion, stating that journey time is 
the most important determinant of market share. Bel (1997) and Gonzalez-Savignat 
(2004) also emphasize the importance of travel time in explaining inter-urban rail 
demand. 
 
A further check as to the likelihood of such a solution outcome to occur requires 
computations of load factors and elasticities, based on the decision variables computed, 
namely prices, frequency and plane/train seat size. The elasticities of frequency and price 
with respect to market share represent reasonable expectations according to the relevant 
literature (Mandel et al. (1997), Brons et al. (2002), Gonzalez-Savignat (2004)). The 
leisure price elasticities are above -1 and business price elasticities are below -1, as 
expected in the literature. Air transport business frequency elasticity with respect to 
market share is higher (approximately 0.45) than leisure fare price elasticity 
(approximately 0.35). It is frequently argued in the air transport literature that load factors 
above 60% cover the cost break-even point, but most airlines strive to achieve more than 
80%, solutions achieved in tables 10. Rail fare elasticities with respect to market share in 
the scenarios whereby rail remains a competitor are in the -0.25 range, slightly lower than 
cited in Wardman et al. (2002), but within the approximate values computed in Mandel et 
al. (1997) and Gonzalez-Savignat (2004). In absolute terms, rail elasticities computed in 
the literature appear to be lower than their air counterparts, as appears in the results of 
this model. The load factors for high-speed rail are also slightly low (in the 55 to 60% 
range) and the reason for this lies in the utility function of passengers. Higher frequency 
and lower prices attract travelers and since high-speed rail is at an initial disadvantage 
due to the longer trip times (at least for those over 500 kilometers), the rail operator 
compensates with lower prices and higher frequency, leading to lower load factors and 
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relatively lower elasticities in comparison to air. Potentially, this model should be 
analyzed with different logit parameters for rail and air transport, however no comparable 
values were available at the time of computation hence we preferred to use those that 
have been validated, if only for air transport. 
 
In order to compare the results of the different scenarios, Table 12 presents a social 
welfare comparison that accounts for consumer, producer, infrastructure manager and 
government surplus less environmental externalities generated. Maximizing social 
welfare may be achieved by upgrading the links of the four TENs under discussion, 
provided the high-speed rail operator pays a low access charge per kilometer (€2) and the 
cost of the infrastructure has been computed reasonably accurately. This implies that 
subsidies may be necessary, however only passenger markets beyond 300 km have been 
considered yet the effect of the upgrades will also apply to the freight market and regional 
services, potentially alleviating congestion on existing lines. Finally, given past 
experience in the high-speed rail markets in England, France and Spain, it has been 
shown that approximately half the travelers on the new links represent new market niches 
and the other half were drawn from existing operators (de Rus and Nash (2007)). 
SCENES (2006) produced a single demand matrix for the current study and were unable 
to produce demand matrices dependent on the existence of upgraded infrastructure. It is 
therefore entirely possible that the demand should have expanded (or contracted) 
according to the scenario, but this has proven beyond the scope of the current paper. 
 
The worst scenario in terms of social welfare would be to upgrade the TEN links and 
charge the rail operator a €10 per km access charge i.e. the full average cost, since 
producer surplus drops (costs increase) and consumer surplus drops (prices increase). The 
rail operator does not achieve profitability, hence no rail tax revenues are collected. If the 
rail operator is expected to cover the entire infrastructure cost through access charges, 
society would be better off without the upgraded links. However, the results in Table 12 
suggest that the rail operator’s tax revenues would be sufficient to cover the fixed costs of 
infrastructure under the lower rail access charge scenario. Note that the external costs in 
Europe are higher when the rail access charge is relatively high because of a modal shift 
to air. With the TEN investments, external costs in Europe are slightly higher than in the 
scenario without the investments because the external cost of high-speed rail exceeds that 
of standard rail and the LC airlines increase frequency to better compete with the 
improved rail competitor. There seems to be little environmental benefit from the TEN 
investments because the rail operator absorbs the benefits of the higher quality by 
increasing fares rather than market share, so transport policy stimulating a modal shift 
from aviation to rail for environmental reasons would require on-track competition, price 
regulation and/or substantial environmental taxes.  
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Table 12: Social Welfare Comparison across Scenarios 
Infrastructure Type basic basic with TENs with TENs 
Rail Access Charge (€/km) 2 10 2 10 
Consumer Surplus  83,485,405  33,364,426  113,082,572  46,028,103 
Producer Surplus  64,108,178  57,264,677  78,613,071  55,108,986 
Environmental Charge 21,015,200   21,660,113   22,285,323   22,095,678   
Air Taxes 25,863,247   29,479,614   25,682,687   28,370,283   
Rail Taxes 7,106,673   0   14,746,893   0   
Government Surplus  64,782,145  61,367,672  75,257,882  60,559,153 
Externalities: Europe  -42,437,503  -44,584,257  -42,711,291  -44,748,975 
Externalities: International  -4,348,313  -4,269,366  -4,309,195  -4,285,381 
Fixed cost of TENs 0   0   -13,423,589   -13,423,589   
Infrastructure Manager Surplus   0   33,490   -13,423,589   -13,390,997 
Social Welfare   165,589,912   103,176,642   206,509,450   99,270,889 
 
The airlines appear able to produce flights at reasonable levels and pay an environmental 
charge of €100 per flight. The high-speed rail operator has been charged €50 per train 
service in all four base scenarios. The lower environmental high-speed rail charge 
represents the lower environmental externalities caused by this mode according to 
INFRAS/IWW (2004) and Janic (2003). This argument is in line with Levinson et al. 
(1997), although the values of the externalities are priced substantially higher in the 
INFRAS/IWW report. 
 
As part of a series of sensitivity analyses, not all of which are presented here for reasons 
of brevity, we tested the effect of the environmental charging policy on the behavior of 
the transport operators. According to Givoni (2007), it is important to analyze the 
environmental impact of transport in monetary terms as opposed to the United 
Kingdom’s Environmental Audit Committee (2003), in which it is argued that 
monetarization should not be emphasized due to the intrinsic difficulties of calculation. 
From Table 13a it is clear that environmental charges in the range of €400 per flight and 
€200 per train service do not substantially affect the overall solution and simply collect 
almost twice the value of the externalities produced. Consumer and producer surplus 
decreases as the environmental charges increase because the transport companies pass on 
at least part of the charges to the passengers hence reducing demand. As a result, external 
costs are reduced.  
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Table 13a: Environmental Charging Policies 
Air Transport Charge (€/flight) 0 100 400 
Rail Charge (€/train service) 0 50 200 
Consumer Surplus  125,262,118  113,082,572  100,275,053 
Producer Surplus  78,998,146  78,613,071  76,187,586 
Environmental Charge 0   22,285,323   84,651,728   
Air Taxes 25,679,383   25,682,687   24,409,064   
Rail Taxes 14,948,235   14,746,893   14,773,123   
Government Surplus  48,753,141  75,257,882  148,600,698 
Externalities: Europe  -42,630,734  -42,711,291  -42,547,629 
Externalities: International  -4,296,704  -4,309,195  -4,250,980 
Fixed cost of TENs  -13,423,589   - 13,423,589    -13,423,589   
Infrastructure Manager Surplus   -13,423,589   -13,423,589   -13,423,589 
Social Welfare   192,662,378   206,509,450   264,841,139 
 
Table 13b shows that demand is lightly affected. Frequencies drop slightly as the charges 
increase and approximately 2,000 less travelers are carried per day across the network 
with each doubling in the charge. However, to dramatically reduce the production of 
transport, sums of substantially greater magnitude would need to be charged. 
 
Table 13b: Changes in Demand with Environmental Charging 
Air Transport Charge (€/flight) 0 100 400 
Rail Transport Charge (€/train service) 0 50 200 
 Primary hub Secondary hub 
Business  
( 000's) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
Business 
(000s) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
Business 
(000s) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
HS1 Paris  Prague  76.898 129.03 77.411 129.1 77.047 131.118 
HS2 England  Hungary  67.642 126.298 68.811 128.263 69.797 129.943 
HS3 Frankfurt  Poland  73.286 129.999 73.405 128.734 73.659 131.151 
LC1 England   76.757 84.582 76.9 85.1 75.589 85.093 
LC2 Berlin   68.24 47.353 67.573 46.977 68.619 47.713 
TN 85.546 138.785 83.745 136.849 82.338 127.121 
No travel 36.641 94.238 37.144 95.213 37.8 97.899 
% air 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.7 
% rail 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Total Traveling (000s) 448.369 656.049 447.845 655.023 447.049 652.139 
Sum Total (000s)   1104.417   1102.868   1099.188 
 
Table 14 presents greater detail with respect to the total number of passengers traveling 
with each alternative within Europe over the four scenarios tested. Approximately 2,300 
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more passengers travel with the high-speed rail operator on the upgraded system per day, 
which amounts to over 800,000 in the course of a year. The rail operator manages to 
increase business demand at the expense of the third HS airline and slightly reduces the 
number of leisure passengers, as it has the opportunity to sell its capacity at higher prices. 
The second LC airline attracts the leisure passengers instead. The balance draws on the 
trade-off between a good scheduled service (represented in the model as the minimum log 
of frequency), total trip time and tariffs, in order to attract passengers in the business and 
leisure markets. The benefits of high-speed rail over LC airlines for business travelers can 
be explained by the fact that stations are usually located in the city center whilst LC 
carriers generally use secondary airports requiring relatively longer trips to the city 
center. 
 
Table 14: Travel Summary 
Infrastructure basic basic with TENs with TENs 
Access charge (€/km) 2 10 2 10 
 Primary hub Secondary hub 
Business  
( 000's) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
Business 
(000s) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
Business 
(000s) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
Business 
(000s) 
Leisure 
(000s) 
HS1 Paris  Prague  78.131 128.832 88.346 142.664 77.411 129.1 87.297 143.209 
HS2 England  Hungary  71.444 128.434 82.097 144.231 68.811 128.263 82.759 144.926 
HS3 Frankfurt  Poland  77.37 132.713 84.159 144.027 73.405 128.734 85.892 146.713 
LC1 England    71.161 78.265 89.057 93.501 76.9 85.1 87.895 91.721 
LC2 Berlin    68.845 46.871 80.092 53.79 67.573 46.977 79.877 53.947 
TN 78.275 140.082 12.748 54.676 83.745 136.849 13.241 53.741 
No travel 39.672 94.965 48.585 117.502 37.144 95.213 48.16 116.464 
% air 0.76 0.69 0.87 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.87 0.77 
% rail 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.07 
Traveling Total (000s) 445.226 655.197 436.499 632.889 447.845 655.023 436.962 634.257 
Sum Total (000s)   1,100.42   1,069.39   1,102.87   1,071.22 
 
Furthermore, if we breakdown the rail market share over distance, it is noticeable that the  
rail system attracts almost 25% in the 750 kilometer or less origin-destination markets but 
this drops to 9% in the longer haul markets, in line with the literature e.g. Janic (2003). In 
analyzing the TENs upgraded routes more specifically, it becomes apparent that 
frequencies may drop without the rail operator losing market share, due to the improved 
trip times.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze a high-speed rail system in order to investigate the implications 
of changes to the network on social welfare. This type of analysis, based on game theory, 
attempts to explore the effects of infrastructure provision and charging on the best 
response function of all competitors in the relevant market. In this context, we have 
modeled the reactions of hub-spoke international alliances and low cost regional airlines 
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on the survivability and profitability of a high-speed rail operator free to utilize the entire 
European rail network in the year 2020. The results of this work suggest that it is possible 
to justify some of the Trans-European high-speed rail projects despite their vast fixed 
costs. The difference between the analysis presented here and the cost-benefit analyses 
that were undertaken previously (Leveinson et al. (1997) and de Rus and Inglada (1997)) 
derives from the fact that we have developed a network based model, whereas many cost-
benefit analyses undertaken generally look at distinct parts of each of the projects 
individually and therefore have ignored to some extent the aggregate network effects. 
Secondly, we have directly modeled the competitive reactions of private transport 
companies to the responses of other operators in the market, taking into account schedule 
quality and price endogenously. 
 
The general conclusions of the paper are as follows. Firstly, it appears worthwhile 
upgrading the TENs modeled (TENs 1, 3, 6 and part of 17), if the authorities are 
interested in maximizing social welfare and encouraging travelers to move from air to rail 
transport modes. However, this conclusion is dependent on the real infrastructure costs 
which, were they to be severely underestimated, may change the equilibria outcomes. 
Secondly, it is worthwhile upgrading to high-speed rail infrastructure if the rail operator 
has access to the entire European network and is charged a marginal cost access charge. 
The increases in consumer, producer and government surpluses are sufficient to cover the 
daily cost of these four TEN projects, estimated at approximately €13.4 million per day 
(for 40 years at a 5% discount rate). Indeed under the low access charge, the high-speed 
rail operator’s corporate taxes would be sufficient to cover the infrastructure cost. This 
would also be the case if a two-part tariff is charged rather than a higher per km access 
charge. However, whilst a two-part tariff is compatible with a franchised monopoly, it 
may prove more problematic if there is on track competition. Consequently, the local 
and/or federal governments would need to be willing to subsidize the construction costs 
to some extent and given the high degree of transit traffic, an EU subsidy scheme could 
be justified. Thirdly, the least appropriate scenario tested would be to upgrade the TENs 
and charge the rail operator an average cost access charge (in the region of €10 per km) 
since the infrastructure would not be utilized efficiently. Finally, it is possible to set an 
environmental charge of €100 per flight and €50 per train service without dramatically 
changing the transport equilibrium, thus collecting approximately half the estimated 
environmental damage, possibly for the purpose of increasing research and development 
in the field and helping the operators to reduce emissions in the longer term. An 
environmental charge of €200 per flight and €100 per train service would cover the 
estimated environmental costs generated, by slightly reducing frequencies and the total 
number of traveling public by approximately 2,000 people per day within Europe. In 
general, the aim is to provide the right incentives for operators to look for cleaner 
operations and for passengers to opt for the more environmentally friendly mode of 
transport. 
 
In this paper we have shown that a network competition model with different types of 
operators (high-speed rail, low cost airlines and conventional airlines) can be formulated, 
yielding results that may be surprising when compared to some of the cost benefit 
analyses. Such results depend on the parameterization of the model but the contribution 
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of this paper is the methodology to analyze different policy options in a network setting, 
taking into account the reactions of relevant competitors. In the air and rail industry, this 
is crucial. 
 
Future directions consist of extensive options as this work represents a first attempt to 
model multiple player types in a competitive, network setting. It may prove interesting to 
extend the game over time, allowing an analysis of yield management techniques and 
permitting greater uncertainty as to demand ranges, which would require a stochastic 
modeling framework and computation of equilibria in a repeated game. If the zones or 
nodes were to represent a single set of one major and one minor airport and a train 
station, the demand and cost functions could be adapted to study congestion, slot 
allocation policies and scarcity charges where relevant. With this level of input 
disaggregation, it would also be possible to analyze multi-modal choice alternatives so 
that passengers could choose two or more modes of transport e.g. purchasing a rail ticket 
from Brussels to Paris and then flying to their final destination. In the current model, 
high-speed rail is viewed purely as a competitor to air transport, however it would appear 
to be not only a substitute but also a likely potential complement to air networks and 
therefore expanding the model to consider such multi-model trips is likely to further 
improve a rail operator’s likelihood of success (Vickerman (1997), Givoni (2007)). In 
addition, the conclusions drawn from the results of the case study are dependent on the 
accuracy of the infrastructure cost evaluation and there appears to be evidence of 
systematic bias in such estimates with regard to large infrastructure projects. Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2003) found that 90% of such projects suffer cost overruns. It may therefore be of 
interest to adapt the model to consider these risk. Finally, expanding the player types to 
include local and federal governments may generate new solution outcomes of interest 
and would require additional objective functions such as minimizing subsidies or 
maximizing social welfare. 
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Appendix A: Trans-European Networks 
 
Trans European 
Network 
Region Country 
1 Berlin Germany 
 Brandenburg and Saxony  
 Halle  
 Mittelfranken  
 Oberbayern  
 Tirol and Vorarlberg Austria 
 Provincia Autonoma Bolzano/Bozen Italy 
 Provincia Autonoma Trento  
 Veneto  
3 Rhône-Alpes and Auvergne France 
 Central Spain Spain 
 Aragón  
 Comunidad de Madrid   
6 Rhône-Alpes France 
 Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste Italy 
 Lombardia  
 Veneto  
 Friuli-Venezia Giulia  
 Slovenija Slovenia 
17 Île de France France 
 Lorraine  
 Alsace  
 Karlsruhe Germany 
 Stuttgart  
 Tübingen  
 Schwaben  
 Oberbayern  
 Salzburg Austria 
 Oberöterreich  
 Wien  
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Appendix B: Mathematical Model and Partial Differentials 
 
A  set of operators 
a  index that represents a specific operator 
m  mode of transport (air, non-air) 
l(m)  set of alternatives in mode m 
N  set of all existing nodes in the network configuration 
i,j,y,z ∈  N node indices 
Rija  set of legs in route connecting origin i to destination j for operator a 
Arc(a)  set of all existing legs in operator a’s specific network configuration 
k ∈  Arc(a) leg index 
s ∈  {b, ℓ} s represents the type of traveler, either business (b) or non-business (ℓ) 
βus parameter in utility function reflecting importance of variable u to type s 
traveler 
dijs type s traveler O-D demand from node i to node j (passengers per week) 
Cka cost of leg k to operator a 
cla parameters in cost function for operator a, l=1,2,3 
fka  service frequency over leg k for operator a 
pijsa     tariff from node i to node j for passenger type s with operator a 
Ska  plane or train size in seats per operator a on leg k 
Mijsa  market share of operator a over O-D trip (i,j) for passenger type s 
Fija  reduction factor on path (i,j) for operator a (load factor ≤ to 1) 
 
The objective function for the hub-spoke airlines is defined in (1a) and the partial 
differentiation with respect to price in (2a), plane sizes in (3a) and frequency in (4a). 
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The objective function for the low-cost airlines is defined in (5a) and the partial 
differentiation with respect to price and frequency is the same as that of the hub-spoke 
airline. The derivative with respect to plane size (the low-cost carriers are assumed to use 
only one plane size throughout their network) is defined in (6a) and the set of constraints 
relevant to low-cost airlines in (7a). 
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Constraints whereby the passenger must purchase two tickets to arrive at their final 
destination (only two are necessary since the assumption is a pure star network) are 
defined in equation (7a). 
 
{ } ( )aArci,j  for ppp hjsaihsaijsa ∉+=        (7a) 
The objective function for the rail operator is defined in (8a) and the partial differentials 
with respect to price, train size and frequency are the same as that of the hub-spoke 
airline. The set of constraints relevant to high-speed rail is defined in (9a). 
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Appendix C: List of Zones and Connecting Train Links  
Zone Zone 
Identity 
Name of Zone Region Direct Rail Connections 
1 AT/01 East Austria AT/02 AT/04         
 
2 AT/02 Vienna AT/01 
AT/04 
    
 
3 AT/03 South Austria IT/07      
 
4 AT/04 Oberöterreich AT/01 AT/05 AT/02     
5 AT/05 Salzburg AT/04 DE/05      
6 AT/06  Tirol and Vorarlberg IT/04 DE/05      
7 BE/01 Belgium DE/13 FR/03 NL/01     
8 CH/01 Switzerland        
9 CZ/01 Czech Republic       
10 DE/01 Stuttgart DE/02 DE/04      
11 DE/02 Karlsruhe DE/01 DE/03 FR/05     
12 DE/03 Freiburg DE/02 FR/05      
13 DE/04 Tübingen DE/01 DE/08      
14 DE/05 Oberbayern AT/05 AT/06 DE/06 DE/08    
15 DE/06 Mittelfranken DE/05 DE/07 DE/14     
16 DE/07 Bayern and Thüringen DE/06 DE/12 DE/14     
17 DE/08 Schwaben DE/04 DE/05      
18 DE/09 Berlin DE/10       
19 DE/10 Brandenburg and Saxony DE/09 DE/11 DE/14     
20 DE/11 Bremen and Lower Saxony DE/10 DE/12      
21 DE/12 South West Germany DE/07 DE/11 DE/13     
22 DE/13 Rheinland and Westphalia BE/01 DE/12      
23 DE/14 Halle DE/07 DE/06 DE/10     
24 DK/01 Denmark        
25 ES/01 North East Spain and North West Spain ES/02 ES/04 FR/08     
26 ES/02 Aragon ES/01 ES/03 ES/04 ES/05    
27 ES/03 Madrid ES/02 ES/04      
28 ES/04 Central Spain ES/01 ES/02 ES/03 ES/06 ES/07 FR/09 PT/01 
29 ES/05 Catalonia ES/02 ES/06 FR/10     
30 ES/06 East Spain ES/04 ES/05      
31 ES/07 South Spain ES/04       
32 FR/01 Île de France FR/02 FR/04      
33 FR/02 Paris Basin FR/01 FR/03 FR/04 FR/06 FR/07 FR/09  
34 FR/03 Nord - Pas-de-Calais BE/01 FR/02 UK/01     
35 FR/04 Lorraine and Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché) 
FR/01 FR/02 FR/05     
36 FR/05 Alsace DE/02 DE/03 FR/04 FR/06    
37 FR/06 Franche-Comté FR/02 FR/05      
38 FR/07 West France FR/02 FR/08      
39 FR/08 South West France ES/01 FR/07 FR/10     
 40
40 FR/09 Rhône-Alpes  and Auvergne ES/04 FR/02 FR/10 IT/01    
41 FR/10 Languedoc-Roussillon ES/05 FR/08 FR/09 FR/11    
42 FR/11 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur FR/10       
43 GR/01 Greece        
44 HU/01 Hungary SI/01       
45 IE/01 Ireland        
46 IT/01 Piemonte and Valle d'Aosta/Vallée 
d'Aoste 
FR/09 IT/03      
47 IT/02 Liguria IT/03       
48 IT/03 Lombardia IT/01 IT/02 IT/06 IT/08    
49 IT/04 Bolzano-Bozen AT/06 IT/05      
50 IT/05 Trento IT/04 IT/06      
51 IT/06 Veneto IT/03 IT/05 IT/07 IT/08    
52 IT/07 Friuli-Venezia Giulia AT/03 IT/06 SI/01     
53 IT/08 Emilia-Romagna IT/03 IT/06 IT/09     
54 IT/09 Central Italy IT/08 IT/10      
55 IT/10 South Italy IT/09       
56 IT/11 Sardegna        
57 NL/01 Netherlands BE/01       
58 PL/01 Poland        
59 PT/01 Portugal ES/04       
60 SE/01 Sweden, Norway and Finland      
61 SI/01 Slovenia HU/01 IT/07      
62 SK/01 Slovakia        
63 TR/01 Turkey        
64 UK/01 United Kingdom FR/03       
65 X1/01 Baltics        
66 X2/01 Russia        
67 X3/01 Balkans        
68 X4/01 Cyprus and Malta       
69 X5/01 Far East        
70 X6/01 Middle East        
71 X7/01 America              
 
